Cases

The PSR and defense submissions documented multiple serious medical conditions and hospitalizations, and defense counsel argued these conditions supported probation. The district judge adopted the PSR, imposed a 30-month prison sentence, and explained that Raoul's medical issues did not meaningfully diminish recidivism risk and that specific deterrence and punishment warranted imprisonment.

The district court concluded the applicable statutory maximum was 10 years, calculated the Guidelines range at 46–57 months, and imposed a 46-month sentence. On appeal the defendant argued the 2-year maximum in §1326(a) applied because §1326(b)(1) was not charged, but the panel affirmed, noting Almendarez-Torres controls.

At sentencing, the guidelines range was 188–235 months. The court sentenced Carpenter to 180 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum for the exploitation charge.

The district court applied the Bail Reform Act and found that, apart from Juarez-Perez's immigration status and detainer, application of the statutory factors compelled a conclusion that a serious risk of flight exists and there are no conditions of release sufficient to secure his appearance. The court relied on four findings: Juarez-Perez's criminal record including convictions for "more than one sex offense, multiple [operating while intoxicated] convictions, and a federal drug trafficking offense"; that the present charge is "supported by what appears to be substantial evidence [showing] that he has—for a third time—illegally reentered t…

The district court imposed concurrent sentences of 360 months’ imprisonment on each count. The court applied the career-offender classification in part because of a prior state drug conviction, and defense counsel withdrew an objection to the PSR paragraph finding that enhancement applicable at sentencing.

The district court applied ACCA after finding three prior violent felony convictions (armed robbery on March 21, 2004; aggravated battery on June 11, 2005; and second-degree murder on December 23, 2011) occurred on different occasions and imposed a 300-month prison term and five years' supervised release. On appeal the Seventh Circuit held the failure to submit the different-occasions question to the jury was error under Erlinger but concluded the error was harmless.

The district court denied Schaumberg’s two motions for compassionate release, finding he had not demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the Bureau of Prisons was adequately managing his medical risks. The judge further ruled that the 60-month sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense and promoted respect for the law, and that early release could not be reconciled with the §3553(a) factors.

The district court imposed the agreed 348-month sentence, finding it was sufficient but not greater than necessary under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) and that the counts reflected the seriousness of Krieg's crimes. The PSR calculated a guidelines range of 97 to 121 months based on total offense level 30 and criminal history category I with zero criminal history points.

The district court sentenced Collins to one year of imprisonment and one year of supervised release and denied her Rule 35 motion to increase the sentence by one day. The court explained the denial was based on the Rule 35 fourteen-day jurisdictional time limit because Collins filed well after that limit and alternatively stated the one-year sentence was the precise sentence it intended to impose.

The sentencing issue involved whether Edwards's 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualified as a 'violent felony' under the ACCA; the probation officer recommended against enhancement and the district court imposed a non-ACCA 60-month sentence. The Seventh Circuit concluded the manslaughter conviction is an ACCA predicate, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing.

No summary recorded.

The court affirmed Smith’s sentence after concluding the district court permissibly applied a two-level § 3B1.3 enhancement for abuse of a position of trust; alternatively, any error was harmless because the district court stated it would have varied to the same sentencing range under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The sentencing determination rested on Smith’s role as Asset Director and testimony that he participated in preparing fraudulent invoices.

The district court imposed a 72-month above-guideline sentence after focusing on Barnes' extensive criminal history (including violent juvenile offenses), his supervised-release violation, and the risk of recidivism. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the court permissibly relied on those § 3553(a) factors and juvenile conduct in sentencing.

The opinion contains no discussion of district-court sentencing rationale, sentencing factors, or themes; it only notes that the district court sentenced Sabaini after denying his post-trial motions. There are no quotations, page citations, or evidentiary references in the opinion regarding the district court's sentencing rationale.

The district court imposed 30 months on the Hobbs Act robbery count and the mandatory minimum 84 months for the brandishing count, totaling 114 months.

The district court imposed a 36-month sentence, citing accountability for the violations and noting the seriousness of the admitted violations, Richards's personal history and criminal history, and the term of imprisonment and supervised release initially imposed. The court also stated the sentence 'provides the defendant with needed correctional treatment,' recommended participation in the Residential Drug Abuse Program, and ordered that upon release Richards be discharged from any further term of supervised release.

No summary recorded.

The district court denied Hernandez's second motion for compassionate release, concluding his age, family circumstances, and COVID-19 risk did not constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons and that the §3553(a) factors weighed against release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the district court did not abuse its discretion based on its §3553(a) analysis emphasizing seriousness and deterrence.

The district court calculated guideline ranges (292 to 365 months for the enticement count; an effective 240 months for the solicitation count), discussed two sentencing enhancements, and, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 121 months’ imprisonment. The court stated it balanced the seriousness of the offense with Rodriguez’s lack of criminal history and other aspects of his history and characteristics.

The district court reduced Best’s sentence under the First Step Act to 40 years’ imprisonment and 4 years’ supervised release and, in deciding not to reduce it further, acknowledged his education and training in prison but noted a dozen disciplinary infractions including fighting. The court emphasized the large scale of the conspiracy, Best’s leadership role, related firearm use, and his prior record of felony convictions and violent crimes.

The district court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 168 months imprisonment and three years supervised release after weighing the § 3553(a) factors. The court emphasized Gavin's unstable childhood, the seriousness and danger of the firearm-involved robberies and their effect on victims, and noted as a slight mitigating factor that Gavin did not brandish or use a firearm during the robberies.

The district court applied the § 2K2.1(c) cross-reference to the first-degree murder guideline and a § 3C1.2 reckless-endangerment enhancement, then considered 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors including seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, deterrence, and protecting the public. The court considered mitigating factors—family history, childhood upbringing, and physical and mental health—but also noted Taylor's three prior unlawful firearm-possession convictions, described an "enormous risk of recidivism," found by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor was culpably involved in Jones's murder, and imposed the statutory max…

The district court sentenced Felton to 240 months' imprisonment followed by ten years of supervised release. Felton did not appeal any aspect of his jury trial but challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress and, alternatively, for a Franks hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the denial of the suppression motion and remanded for an evidentiary hearing under Franks v. Delaware.

The opinion does not articulate explicit 3553(a) sentencing rationale themes such as seriousness of the offense, deterrence, or public safety. It does state that both Probation and the government recommended a within-Guidelines range of 21–27 months and that the district court found the Guidelines range to be 21–27 months and imposed a 21-month sentence.

The court affirmed the sentence after applying a four-level § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement based on its finding that Cornelius’s possession was connected to criminal recklessness and imposing concurrent 97-month terms at the bottom of the enhanced guidelines range. The court found by a preponderance that Cornelius’s reasonable fear had ended once the assailants fled—principally because he admitted he continued firing as they drove away—and concluded Erlinger did not require a jury finding for an advisory-guidelines calculation.

The district court sentenced White to 180 months on the armed bank robbery count and 120 months consecutive on the firearm count, for a total of 300 months’ imprisonment. In announcing the sentence the court relied on §3553(a) factors, emphasized the violent nature of the offense and White's active role, noted the burden on her four children while attributing responsibility to her actions, and justified disparities because co-defendants cooperated and testified while she did not.

The district court imposed a within-guidelines 118-month sentence after applying a three-level U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) enhancement for recruiting at least twelve accomplices and a two-level § 3C1.1 obstruction enhancement for fabricating vision problems to delay trial. The court stated it had considered and explained all required 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and addressed unwarranted sentencing disparities.

The district court sentenced Brown to concurrent 13-year terms for the terrorism and drug convictions and a consecutive 5-year § 924(c) term, with five years of supervised release (total 18 years imprisonment). The court expressly noted the sentence did not exceed the combined statutory maximums and that the district judge did not consider any constitutionally impermissible factor at sentencing, and the appellate waiver precluded a sentencing challenge.

The district court applied the §2251(e) enhancement based on Wilson’s 2006 Illinois conviction and, with no objection, imposed a sixty-year sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on plain-error review, concluding Wilson could not show the application of the enhancement was clear or obvious error.

The district court relied on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the Sentencing Guidelines, and mitigation evidence at the resentencing. The court removed two criminal-history points for committing the offense while on parole, reduced Rivers's criminal-history category to III (Guidelines range 63–78 months), and imposed a 73-month sentence for the carjacking followed by a mandatory 120-month consecutive § 924(c) sentence.

The district court imposed a within-guidelines sentence of 240 months’ imprisonment and a life term of supervised release, adopting the presentence investigation report. The court justified supervised release by noting Koeckeritz’s personality traits that put him at risk of re-offending and the need to protect the community.

The district court accepted the PSR calculations and imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 41 months’ imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and mandatory restitution. The court weighed the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature, circumstances, and seriousness of the offense; Ramos-Soto’s history and characteristics; and the need to protect the public.

The district court declined Blake’s § 3582(c)(2) reduction because it found the record supported a drug quantity of approximately 10.5 kilograms of crack, keeping his guidelines range at 360 months to life, even after reducing his criminal history category to II. The court also concluded that Ivory’s testimony supported a finding of at least 8.4 kilograms of crack; Blake had argued that retroactive guideline changes and his post-offense conduct warranted a lower range of 324 to 405 months.

The district court granted a partial Rule 35(b) reduction, finding Johnston's assistance useful but limiting the reduction to 10% because his repetitive frivolous postconviction litigation evidenced a failure to accept responsibility and lack of remorse; the court also referenced § 3553(a) factors and his recidivist history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that consideration of those factors and the discretionary weight given to them were lawful and unreviewable under § 3742(a).

The district court based its sentence on consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), emphasizing the severity of Francisco-Juan’s conduct and his repeated unlawful re-entries; the PSR reflected a criminal history category of III and a guidelines range of life for the conspiracy counts. The court adopted the guidelines calculations and imposed life sentences with concurrent five-year supervised-release terms on the conspiracy counts.

The court considered Jackson’s mitigating arguments (employment, family) but found the July 2024 beating severe and noted the offense occurred shortly after release. Emphasizing deterrence and community protection, the court imposed the statutory-maximum 24-month imprisonment term.

The district court considered multiple mitigating factors (mental-health treatment, low recidivism risk, lack of criminal history, family support, employment, compliance with pretrial release) and multiple aggravating factors (long duration of conduct, encouragement of another to sexually abuse children, and victim impact statements showing continuing harm). The court also stated it had considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and Siegel twice indicated the court had considered his mitigating arguments and declined further elaboration.

The district court adopted the fourth loss formula ($69.3 million), granted deductions for $6.9 million returned to investors and $7.8 million for claimed websites, denied the $22 million buy-back and an operating/infrastructure deduction, calculated a final loss of $52.5 million (yielding offense level 37 and a Guidelines range of 210–262 months), and imposed a 90-month sentence. The appellate court affirmed, finding Courtright waived any causation challenge by agreeing to the $69.3 million figure and concluding the district court did not clearly err in denying the operating-expense deduction because there was no evidence that upfront fees…

The district court imposed an above-guidelines 90-month sentence and explained the variance by citing Runnels’s extensive prior criminal history, his lack of rehabilitation, deterrence, and public-safety concerns. The court also noted the seriousness of the offense, including that cocaine and a gun were found in a home with a toddler.

No summary recorded.

The district court based its sentence on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, emphasizing the seriousness of Sandiego's tax fraud and the significant personal gain from his high-volume tax-preparation business. The court also considered that Sandiego was a first-time, nonviolent offender with serious medical ailments. The court imposed a below-guidelines sentence of sixteen months' imprisonment on each count to run concurrently and one year of supervised release.

No summary recorded.

A jury convicted Phillip Mayfield of two counts of distributing methamphetamine. He argued on appeal that the district court violated the Speedy Trial Act but waived that claim by failing to move to dismiss in the district court and abandoned it at oral argument, instead arguing the district court abused its discretion by overlooking the government’s alleged lack of diligence in obtaining Facebook records; the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding the district court properly exercised its discretion in granting the continuance and finding Mayfield did not show prejudice.

The district court considered Petre's autism and related mitigation but concluded he appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct, relying on his admission that requested images were "illegal" and his statements about needing to stop. The court emphasized aggravating factors—duration, sheer volume and disturbing nature of the materials, and direct solicitation of minors—imposed a 180-month sentence (below the 210–240 month guideline range), and this court affirmed.

The district court imposed 262 months' imprisonment for the drug conviction and a concurrent 120 months for the firearm conviction, and imposed concurrent supervised-release terms of eight and three years. In sentencing the court acknowledged family support and McCreary's positive changes while incarcerated but relied on his extensive, serious, and violent criminal history and the seriousness of the armed drug-trafficking offense, stating it would have imposed the same sentence even if he was not a career offender based on the § 3553(a) factors.

The district court adopted the presentence investigation report’s recommended guidelines range and, after weighing the § 3553(a) factors, imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. The court balanced the need to deter a repeat offender against Harris’s non-violent criminal record, traumatic childhood, and desire for rehabilitation, and Harris waived procedural guideline challenges by agreeing the calculations were accurate.

The district court imposed a life sentence and justified it under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), describing the offenses as "shockingly violent and showed an incomprehensible amount of disregard for human life" and considering Luciano's difficult upbringing, role as a father, low criminal-history category, "severe substance abuse issues," and consistent employment. The court distinguished Luciano from his co-conspirators (finding his conduct more serious and that he did not accept responsibility) and imposed concurrent three-year terms of supervised release on each count.

The district court sentenced Seiwert to a term of imprisonment of twelve months and one day and to three years of supervised release on each count, to be served concurrently. The opinion does not provide any discussion of the district court’s sentencing rationale or the 3553(a) factors.

The district court adopted the PSR with changes that resulted in a total offense level of 31 and a Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months, and sentenced Burton to 135 months' imprisonment and 5 years' supervised release. The court explained the sentence by citing § 3553(a) factors: the seriousness of the methamphetamine quantity, Burton’s history of drug addiction and current sobriety, a prior methamphetamine-manufacturing offense, and the need for rehabilitation and vocational training while incarcerated.